4
4
LESALE CANAAN DUA VAYOORS, FRANZ
(We have not yet approached the Chinese, to Cance their agreement being
Lorime
w the be
of Contingency
1(a) (ii))
-181 SECRET!
94
POSSIBLE COLLAPSE OF JAPAN BEFORE
THE RE-OCCUPATION OF HONG KONG.
Mir. Gent
We have had discussions with various authorities (War Office, Foreign Office, S.0.2) as to the preparations which might be made to cover the possible contingencies of
2.
(a) the recapture of Hong Kong by a
normal military operation either
(i) by a sea-borne landing of British and/or American forces;
(ii) an operation from China by American-directed Chinese forces;
(b) the occupation of Hong Kong by
Chinese irregular forces not under the raccontrol of Chiang Kai Shek;
(c) the evacuation of Hong Kong by the
Japanese, which would naturally lead to a situation as at (b).
To meet contingency (a) we have formed the Hong Kong Planning Unit as nucleus for a military Civil Affairs Administration of the Colony, the intention being that the Unit, at the appropriate time, would be moved to the area from which the operation was being launched so that it could enter Hong Kong with the occupying forces.
3.
A provisional scheme is also being worked out to meet contingencies (b) and (c).
4.
We have more recently been considering the situation which might arise in the event of its becoming apparent that Japan would either surrender (or be likely to collapse from the general military point of view) before a regular military operation had been mounted with the object of recapturing Hong Kong, and we have felt that the time has come when some provision should be made against this contingency. The general agreement amongst those whom we have consulted on this matter is that the best course would be to prepare a paper for the consideration or the Chiefs of Staff suggesting that instructions should be issued to some appropriate fleet units to proceed to Hong Kong as soon as possible when any such collapse of Japan seemed to be iminent. We felt that similar provision should be made, if possible to meet the contingency in paragraph 1 (c).
5.
This action would serve as an assertion
of British authority and the fleet nits concerned would no doubt be able to establish order by landing parties. But this action would not in itself provide an immediate means of restoring any of the normal machinery of government. All that it would achieve would be the setting up of a military administration in its crudest form.
6.
It would only be by a most unlikely coincidence that the Civil Affairs Unit would be so conveniently disposed geographically as to be
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